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One of the burdens of an atomic age is a continual lag between 
problem and solution. No sooner does one manage to cope with the 
problems of yesterday than one is faced with the new and even more 
pressing problems of today. Planning, zoning, and subdivision control 
are no exception to this rule. In just a short time, a minimum of 
land-use regulation has been accepted which w ill bring order into the 
community; i.e., regulation which, so to speak, w ill keep the pig out 
of the parlor. Even these controls would probably shock our grand­
fathers; however, in the last several years, planning authorities have 
considered even more drastic approaches to the regulation of land use. 
Subdivision controls w ill have an important role to play in this process. 
The metropolitan building boom goes on at a rapid pace, forcing 
municipalities to use subdivision regulations to shape the new urban 
growth which is sprouting on the edge of almost every city. It is thought 
that a discussion of some of the difficult legal questions which this new 
approach to planning w ill bring w ill be of interest.
Since the war, communities have been faced with what some call 
galloping suburbanitis. New terms and expressions exist which reflect 
the atomic era: metrofission, the exploding metropolis, urban sprawl. 
How do subdivision controls fit into this picture ? A little bit of history 
will be helpful here. Originally, the purpose of subdivision regulation 
was to make more convenient and certain the conveyance of land and 
the recording of titles to land. It is well known that the legal descrip­
tion of land can often be very complicated. The legal description is 
often called the metes-and-bounds description because it describes the 
plot in terms of boundaries. It may go something like this—“beginning 
at a point 100 yards from where the bear crossed the river, down the 
Old Granny Road to where the mill used to stand,” and so on. This 
may be an exaggeration, but there are worse examples. These de­
scriptions may often be very difficult to trace on a map. They are 
very cumbersome to use in conveyancing if for no other reason than 




The original purpose of subdivision regulation was to permit the 
subdivider to divide land into lots and blocks. This technique is 
primarily useful in urban communities. The subdivided tract is shown 
on what is called a plat, which is recorded with the county recorder. 
Thereafter, the subdivider can convey the land with reference to the 
plat—Lot One in Jones Addition to the City of Huntersville, and so 
on. This process is simple and once the plat is recorded, the possibility 
of error in land conveyancing is considerably less.
The next step in subdivision control was to recognize that when raw 
land was subdivided, the community has an interest in seeing that certain 
necessary standards are imposed on the developer to insure that the 
development will take place in a proper way. At first, the standards 
were what may be called quantitative; that is, they were related to 
physically measurable requirements such as the width and paving of 
streets, the provision of drainage facilities, setbacks, and lot sizes. W ith 
hardly an exception, the courts have now recognized that these require­
ments may properly be imposed on the subdivider, without compensation, 
as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In this metro-atomic age, however, many have begun to feel that 
the restrictions and regulations applicable to land subdivisions should 
take on a different character. Sometimes the phrase “qualitative control” 
is used; that is, it is desired that the subdivision fit into the general 
community structure in a way that w ill not be harmful to community 
development. That is a lot of language and a very general statement. 
Perhaps it w ill be more helpful if the subject is divided into three more 
specific categories.
First, to isolate a preliminary difficulty, as subdivision regulations 
have become more common and have grown tighter, difficulties have 
occurred with evaders. A way must be found to handle the wildcatting 
subdivider before thought can be given to tighter quality subdivision con­
trols. Second, municipalities are beginning to recognize that new sub­
divisions impose costs on the municipality which are very difficult if 
not impossible to recoup by way of special assessment or by way of the 
general property tax. Partly because of convenience, partly because of 
a feeling that the subdivider should bear some of these costs, some 
municipalities in some states have begun to impose lot fees on the sub­
division of raw land.
Finally, much attention is being given to the placing of controls on 
the wholesale subdivision of land itself. In particular, concern has been 
voiced about the problem of timing in relation to subdivision develop­
ment. Can we continue to afford the land wastage which occurs when
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subdividers leapfrog and pepperpot all over the fringe area of a munici­
pality? Can one afford to let new subdivisions outrun the provision of 
schools and other community services?
To borrow the atomic metaphor once more, each of the solutions 
to these problems presents questions of legal limits which are similar 
to the space limits which are presently faced by the astronauts. Not 
all of the attempts to conquer outer space have been successful, and 
not all of the attempts to deal with land space have been successful 
either. They have run up against legal limitations which have been as 
difficult as the limitations faced in space travel. The writer is convinced 
that legally acceptable solutions will be found.
W hat about the builder who seeks to evade the subdivision regu­
lations? How can this problem arise? To get an answer to this 
question, the planning enabling statute must be examined. The general 
statute, passed in 1947, which applies to most of the planning commissions 
in the state of Indiana, provides (in § 53-745) that after a master plan 
and subdivision ordinance have been adopted, no plan of a subdivision 
shall be filed with the auditor or recorded with the recorder unless it 
has first been approved by the plan commission. The trouble with this 
section is twofold. It does not state that everybody must file for 
approval with the plan commission before conveying property. Nor 
does the section contain a definition of the word subdivision.
It is not intended that every individual who conveys land must first 
obtain permission from the plan commission which has jurisdiction. 
For example, certainly no permission would be required if the owner 
of a farm wishes to convey that farm to a son or to another purchaser. 
Nor would prior permission be necessary in other cases in which an 
owner of farm land wishes to sell off part of it for farm purposes. 
However, when raw land is split up for urban purposes, some action 
should be taken by the plan commission to insure that the necessary 
minimum requirements for urban living and urban design are met.
At the present time, since there is no definition of a subdivision and 
since the approval of the plan commission is not required for conveyance, 
the situation is this—a builder may in fact subdivide land and make a 
plat. The approval of the plan commission is not necessary because 
the subdivider simply may not record the plat and convey by metes-and- 
bounds. In this manner, the law is evaded. In other words, there is 
nothing to prevent the builder from drawing up a plat showing the 
lots and then conveying, not with reference to the plat, but by the legal 
description. Of course, there are various penalties contained in the 
planning law which seek to prevent this from happening, but they are
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not strong enough, they have not been enforced often enough, and 
therefore they do not really work.
As previously stated, the difficulty lies partly in the definition of 
subdivision. The statute should perhaps indicate first of all what a 
subdivision really is. Having done that, the law should indicate that 
any person who subdivides will have to come to the plan commission 
for approval and it should include a penalty sufficient to prevent the 
subdivider from conveying land with reference to a plat without first 
obtaining permission.
Taking the problem of subdivision definition first, it would be helpful 
to refer to a recent California law. This law is typical of the laws in 
many states which define subdivision as the division of land into a given 
number of parcels during any one year. The California law states that 
subdivision means the division of land by the subdivider into five or 
more parcels within any one-year period. Perhaps the one danger with 
this kind of definition is that the small builder who only sells off two 
or three houses a year is left out of this law. So the law would be 
tighter if subdivision were defined as the division of any one tract into 
two or more tracts. The laws in some states are so written, and of 
course this kind of definition is practically air tight. Any time land 
is divided into two or more plots, then the subdivision regulations apply.
However, this kind of a regulation has other dangers. It does not, 
in terms, exempt the selling off by a farmer of a certain part of property 
for agricultural uses. One way to take care of this problem would be 
to define the agricultural uses which would be exempt from the 
subdivision law. Then, any conveyance for an agricultural use would 
not be under the provisions of the ordinance. The trouble, of course, 
with this definition is that it is very difficult to enforce. Not every 
subdivision of land would come before the commission. The interpreta­
tion of the exclusion would be left with the subdivider, and the plan 
commission would have to find the violators.
The California law does not approach the exclusion problem in 
this way. Two general exclusions are made from the planning require­
ments. The first exclusion is any parcel of five acres or less which 
abuts on an existing street, which does not require a street opening or 
widening, and for which the lot design meets the approval of the govern­
ing body. Notice that this is not a complete exemption from the sub­
division law, but because the parcel abuts on an already existing street 
or highway, the subdivider need only comply with the lot design 
requirement of the governing body. The second exclusion from the 
California law consists of those parcels of land of a net area of one acre
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or more for which a tentative map has been submitted to the governing 
body and which have been approved as to street alignment, street width, 
drainage, and lot design. Again note that the exemption is only partial. 
Again the subdivision or lot must be submitted to the planning body 
and again certain minimum requirements are imposed.
This approach is subject to question. Legitimate objections may be 
raised as to the need for so comprehensive a definition as well as to 
the necessity of including every division of land within the subdivision 
regulations. In fact, the California exclusion provisions follow closely 
the practice which has been adopted in some Indiana counties of re­
quiring the subdivider who does not fall under the subdivision regulations 
to file a petition for exclusion from the subdivision law. The writer 
understands that this petition works in a way which is similar to the 
method contemplated by the California statute. The subdivider need 
only comply with certain minimum requirements of the subdivision 
regulations and having so complied, is exempted from any further com­
pliance. This particular practice has led to protests in some areas. It 
is felt that the legal status of this regulation under existing law is 
doubtful. The writer does not believe that there is explicit authority 
to engage in this practice, and it is thought that if challenged in a court 
suit, the practice might be held to be ultra vires—that is, beyond the 
provisions of the enabling act. In the last legislature, a bill was intro­
duced which would have forbidden this practice. It was drafted so 
widely, however, that it would have thrown a very serious doubt on 
the propriety of all subdivision regulations. This bill was not passed. 
Perhaps the whole problem should be reconsidered with a thought to 
the eventual clarifying legislation.
If a statute similar to the California law were adopted the question 
of penalties would still have to be met. The writer feels that criminal 
penalties and injunction provisions are of limited usefulness. Some 
states have attempted other approaches to the matter with varying suc­
cess; a few of these are presented for consideration. It is possible to 
link the issuance of building permits to the subdivision regulations. 
Under this approach, no building permit would be issued unless the 
subdivision regulations had been complied with. A second approach is 
to provide by law that a purchaser may set aside the sale of a piece of 
property in a subdivision which has not been approved. This solution 
would approach the problem of planning through the land title. It is 
felt that this approach has real possibilities if the cooperation of the 
real estate and banking professions can be obtained. For example, it 
might be desirable to provide by law that no mortgage may validly be
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issued on land which is not in an approved subdivision. This would 
be pretty stiff. But it might be a very helpful way of checking the 
evader.
As an alternative, the laws might be tightened on the acceptance of 
deeds for recording and it made very clear that the recorder is not 
to accept any deed which is not in an approved subdivision. It could 
then be made clear that a recorded deed in an unapproved subdivision 
would be incapable of passing title to property. Perhaps the county 
recorder is not the official to enforce the subdivision law, however. A 
final approach which deserves mention is the “Blue Sky” approach. It 
is known that the procedure in securities regulation is to let the issuer 
market any security, but the financial background of the company 
must be very carefully specified. A similar suggestion has been made 
in planning circles. If the conveyance is in a subdivision which is not 
in compliance with the subdivision law, it would be stamped or other­
wise marked to indicate quite clearly to the purchaser that the lot is 
in an unapproved subdivision and that the purchaser is subject to all 
the penalties and costs which follow from making such a purchase.
The second development discussed herein is the lot fee. When 
levied, these fees are used to provide for services which are difficult 
to provide for by special assessment or by the general property tax. One 
example would be recreational spaces and parks. Another example 
would be schools. Still another example would be drainage facilities. 
The difficulty, of course, is that new homes in residential areas create a 
considerable demand for services on the municipality. It is common 
knowledge that homes do not begin to pay in taxes for the benefits 
which they require. One way out of this dilemma is to require the 
subdivider to dedicate at least the land for parks and schools. It is 
felt that there would be no difficulty with such a requirement as it 
would probably be held to be reasonably incidental to and related to 
the land subdivision regulations. Practical problems would arise, how­
ever. W hat does a municipality do, for example, with the very small 
subdivision of six lots? Obviously, in that case the subdivider cannot be 
asked to dedicate part of the property. The municipality would 
end up with a small strip of land which would be practically worthless 
for park or any other purposes.
Furthermore, it usually happens that the drainage facilities or sewage 
facilities which are needed for new subdivisions are not all located on 
or near the subdivision. In many cases, they w ill consist of facilities 
or mains which are located away from the subdivision area, but which 
are nevertheless required because the subdivision has been built. In
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these cases it is very difficult to apportion costs. If one thinks solely 
of dedication of land, for example, the subdivision which happens to 
be close to the particular facility w ill have to dedicate. The subdivision 
which is not close w ill not have to dedicate the land. The problem is 
even more acute if the total cost of the facility is placed on the sub­
division that happens to be nearby. Nor would use of the special 
assessment procedure help. Special assessments can only be levied for 
benefits received. For example, it is doubtful that a lot could be assessed 
for a pumping facility located several miles away. One court has 
recently voided an assessment of this type. An Indiana law exists which 
permits the costs for a main sewer to be apportioned on a local and on 
a wider, district basis. But the procedure is very cumbersome. Again, 
one way out of this dilemma is to charge a lot fee.
During the past few years there have been several cases adjudicating 
the status of the lot fee. Two of them were decided within the last 
few months. In practically all of these cases, the decision of the court 
was unfavorable. This is cautionary, but it is felt that this current of 
authority should not lead to giving up attempts to levy a lot fee. It is 
felt that the unfavorable judicial reaction is due in part to the fact 
that the device is a new one. The courts are not used to it. They do 
not know how to catalog it. They do not known how to deal with it. 
As an original proposition, it would seem that if the municipality can 
demand of a builder who has a large subdivision the donation of several 
acres for playgrounds, then it can demand of a builder who has a small 
subdivision the donation of an equivalent in the form of a money 
payment.
Some of the courts have treated the question as one of vires—that 
is, as a question of statutory authority. In an Oregon case which was 
decided just this February, the county charged a lot fee of $37.50 
which was to be used for park purposes. The approach of the court 
was to hold that the lot fee was not authorized by the enabling legisla­
tion. This legislation was in the usual form and it was similar to the 
enabling legislation which exists in the state of Indiana. It provided, 
for example, that the subdivision standards could take into account the 
public health, safety, or general welfare of the community. However, 
the court held that the statute did not authorize a fee or a tax but 
simply authorized a regulation of land use. Consequently, the fee was 
beyond the intent of the statute.
There was an alternate ground for the courts decision, and it presents 
a very difficult question. The subdivider contended that the fee was a 
revenue measure designed to produce money for public purposes, and,
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therefore, was a tax which the county had not been authorized to levy. 
The contention of the county appeared to be that the fee was simply 
incidental to the regulation of subdivisions, and therefore was merely 
secondary to an exercise of the police power. For example, if the county 
had seen fit to levy a small fee to bear the cost of inspecting new 
subdivisions, there would have been no difficulty with the case. In that 
event, the fee would have been incidental to the subdivision regulation.
The court skipped away from this problem. It held that the 
regulation “authorizes the county to lay a tax upon one class of land- 
owners for a public purpose, which may be but need not be related to 
the activity being regulated.” In other words, the contention of the 
court was that there was no limitation on the area in which the money 
could be spent, since the money could be spent for parks which were not 
located near or which would not be used by the new homes. Therefore, 
it was not related to the regulatory purpose.
A similar conclusion was reached by a lower California court in a 
decision handed down a few years ago. Their subdivision enabling act 
was more limited and only authorized regulations dealing with the 
design and improvement of subdivisions. The court again held that the 
statute did not authorize the levy of a fee. As in the Oregon case, the 
money was to be used for park purposes and could be spent anywhere 
in the area and not necessarily in the area in which the new homes 
would be built.
A final and very interesting decision was handed down a couple 
of years ago by the Supreme Court of Michigan. This case involved 
the levy of a permit fee which was supposed to take care of the inci­
dental police and other costs which were incurred in connection with 
the building of new subdivisions. For example, the city alleged that 
fires had to be put out while a subdivision was being built and that 
during construction it had to be policed so that vandalism would not 
occur. The purpose of this lot fee was to pay for the costs of policing 
and otherwise taking care of the new subdivisions while they were being 
built. Again, the issue was discussed in terms of whether or not this 
was a tax which was not authorized or simply an incidental fee which 
contributed to the regulatory police power. In this case, the amounts 
raised by the fee were so great that they were out of proportion to the 
costs which were incurred. The court held that the amount raised was 
excessive and that the fee was not authorized to this extent. However, 
they did say that it was permissible under the statute for the municipal­
ity to levy a lot fee which would take care of the actual costs which 
the city would have to incur in policing new subdivisions while they 
were under construction.
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Attention is directed once more to a recent California statute which 
seeks to clear up the problem raised by lot fees in that state. This 
California statute now authorizes the levy of lot fees to defray the 
actual or estimated costs of constructing what are termed planned 
drainage facilities. The statute is quite detailed. One of the conditions 
imposed is that the costs of the drainage facilities must be fairly ap­
portioned throughout the drainage area either on the basis of benefits 
conferred or on the need for facilities created by the proposed sub­
divisions. Furthermore, the fee imposed must not exceed the amount 
which would be imposed on the lots in the area if the assessment were 
on a per acre basis rather than on an area basis.
This statute is very carefully drawn. It makes the legislative intent 
very clear and an analogy might be drawn to a special assessment. In 
other words, it could be claimed that this particular lot fee was not a 
tax but was in the nature of a special assessment. A special assessment 
need not meet the constitutional rules as to uniformity of taxation, but 
the special assessment, on the other hand, can only be levied for benefits 
conferred. The difficulty with the special assessment analogy in this case 
is that no notice or hearing provisions are provided, as the California 
legislature has definitely tied the fee in with the subdivision regulation 
process. To the writer’s knowledge, this statute has not been tested. 
It is believed that it would be quite helpful if here in Indiana some 
thought were given to legislation of this type and to possible ways in 
which lot fees could be levied on subdividers to help defray the cost of 
the facilities which new subdivisions require.
Finally, it was indicated that something was to be said about the 
planning of new development in fringe areas. Many are worried by 
the fact that new development often outstrips the provision of new 
community facilities. There is also worry about the fact that new 
developments seem to hop, skip, and jump all over the countryside 
without any relationship to facilities that are offered or that might be 
offered within a reasonable period of time. The solution to this prob­
lem has, so far, been indirect and communities have, so far, proceeded 
under zoning ordinances rather than under the subdivision regulations. 
For example, one approach has been to provide for acre zoning in the 
fringe areas. Lots are zoned so as to require five, six, or ten acres 
per house. This w ill obviously discourage the large scale subdivision 
and will thereby prevent the building of houses which will require 
new services and facilities in advance of demand.
W hat about a direct approach to the timing problem? In one 
recent case, a small New York town enacted a regulation which pro­
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vided that when taking into consideration the granting of a permit for 
a subdivision, the municipality could consider whether or not the 
existing community facilities were adequate. A subdivider applied 
for a permit to double the permitted density requirements. The muni­
cipality found that existing school facilities were inadequate and there­
fore rejected the application. In this case, the regulation was upheld as 
it was found to be within the terms of the enabling statute and was 
found not to have exceeded the limits of the police power.
Other more direct methods have not fared so well in the New 
York courts. One small New York town passed an ordinance which 
provided that the building of homes was a business. They then sought 
to license this business of building homes and they took care of the 
problem of new homes by restricting the number of licenses in any 
one year and thereby the number of homes that were built. This 
ordinance was thrown out as being unauthorized by the statute because, 
said the court, it was an attempt to impose a subdivision regulation in 
the guise of a licensing provision. Since the municipality does not have 
the statutory power to license, the regulation could not stand.
These cases highlight the familiar fact that suburban communities 
in a metropolitan area usually are not anxious to take on new hous­
ing. If they accept anything at all, it w ill not be a large-scale sub­
division which generates a lot of children and thus a need for schools 
and other facilities. To a certain extent, these suburban municipalities 
cannot be blamed for this attitude. It has been noted earlier that new 
residential subdivisions cannot pay their own way and have generated 
a greater demand for services than the taxes which are paid on the 
property. Furthermore, under present planning laws the suburban 
municipalities have no way of deciding just when and just where the 
new subdivisions will be built. Fortunately, in Indiana ample and 
adequate legislation exists which provides for planning and zoning on 
a metropolitan basis as is presently being done in Marion county and 
other counties. When planning is projected on a metropolitan level, 
some of the problems which arise because of competing municipal needs 
and desires do not develop.
Even within a metropolitan framework, some attention will have 
to be given to the question of regulating the tempo, timing, and sequence 
of new residential development. One approach is that taken by the 
New York municipality already discussed which regulated the density 
of new subdivisions according to the availability of community services. 
Another approach would be for the subdivision ordinance to set up a 
priority system for the use of land. The planning department would
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then decide which vacant areas would be used first, which second, 
which third, etc. The provision of new schools, new parks, and other 
community facilities could then be geared to the building of housing. A 
question then arises as to whether the planning and zoning enabling act 
in Indiana is broad enough to permit this kind of priority zoning.
One case came up in Connecticut which involved the attempt of a 
small town near New Haven to engage in subdivision regulation of 
this type. In this case the municipality turned down the subdivision 
because it was found that additional housing would impose a financial 
burden on the community. As in the New York case, findings were 
based on the absence of school facilities. Contrary to the New York 
court, however, the Connecticut court held that the enabling act did 
not authorize a refusal for this reason. Because the planning and 
enabling legislation did not speak directly to the problem of timing, 
sequence, and need, the Connecticut court is probably correct.
There is a technical distinction between the New York and Con­
necticut cases, however, which is very important and which probably 
explains why the courts reached different results. In the New York 
case the town did not attempt to prohibit the subdivision entirely. 
In that case the town simply refused to lower the density requirements. 
The ordinance called for building lots of 40,000 square feet and the 
builder wanted a special permit which would have authorized building 
at a density of 22,500 square feet. In other words, the density would 
almost have doubled. Since the enabling act speaks directly to the ques­
tion of density and explicitly authorizes municipalities to regulate density 
when passing subdivision ordinances, the New York case is probably 
correct. Because the enabling acts do not give explicit authority to reject 
outright an application for a new subdivision because of need, the Con­
necticut court is also probably correct.
In the course of this discussion some court opinions have been 
reviewed which in many cases have been unfavorable to the kinds of 
subdivision regulations presented in this paper. In the opinion of the 
writer, these unfavorable court opinions do not necessarily reflect judicial 
antagonism to this kind of subdivision control. Instead, it seems that 
the unfavorable court decisions simply reflect a growing tension in the 
administration and in the operation of subdivision requirements. W e 
are, for the most part, operating under enabling acts which were drafted 
and enacted in the 1920s. Municipalities operating in the 1960s now 
see problems of land-use control which were never thought about in 
the 1920s. These municipalities attempt by one device or another to 
work out regulations and ordinances which fit into the statutory scheme
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of the 1920s and which will still permit them to handle the new problems 
which have arisen. Many times, however, the statutory scheme is inade­
quate. In many of the cases which have been discussed and which have 
reached unfavorable conclusions, the basis for the decision was not 
necessarily that the ordinance passed or the regulation enacted was un­
constitutional but that there was no statutory authority for the municipal 
action which was taken.
Where does all of this lead ? Several problems have been briefly 
reviewed in the operation and administration of subdivision controls. 
New problems have arisen even before the basic essentials of subdivision 
control have been fully assimilated, and even before some municipalities 
and many counties have enacted the necessary basic regulations. It has 
been seen that in many cases the wildcatting builder manages to evade 
the subdivision laws because of a technicality in draftsmanship. It has 
been seen that existing provisions for the dedication of land and levy of 
assessments for public improvements are inadequate and that municipali­
ties in some areas of the country are experimenting with lot fees in 
order to raise the necessary additional funds. Finally, it has been seen 
that in some cases, the municipality has regulated the tempo, sequence, 
and timing of new development in order that new housing will not 
outstrip the provision of community facilities and in order that de­
velopment will take place in an orderly fashion.
W hat is needed now is a wholesale rethinking of the aims and the 
purposes of subdivision control. The provisions which define a subdivi­
sion and the scope of the subdivision regulations need to be tightened. 
New and more adequate techniques of local government finance are 
needed. Finally, more attention must be given to the shape and form 
of communities in order to prevent land wastage and in order to insure 
that all citizens are able to enjoy adequate community facilities. These 
are just some of the problems which planning, zoning, and subdivision 
regulation must face in the new, metro-atomic age.
